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The Impact of Human Rights Abuses and
Emigration in Venezuela
Caroline Hanna
Honors Research Project – Political Science

Introduction
This research paper analyzes the connection between human rights abuses committed by
the Nicolas Maduro regime and the high levels of emigration. These human rights issues are
addressed by the research question: Have the existing human rights abuses that are committed by
the Maduro government led to the high levels of emigration that has greatly impacted many
countries? Human rights abuses are a significant issue within the Venezuelan state, and it is
important to address other variables some of which include the economic situation, a decaying
public health care system, fraudulent elections, COVID-19, and external state actors that have
led many people to lose faith in their political institutions and forced them to look for new
opportunities in other countries. A majority of these human rights abuses occurred during the
Hugo Chavez regime in the 1990s to 2010s and the situation has worsened since Nicolas Maduro
took control of the country. Research in this area has been growing as many countries, including
the United States, struggle to create a coherent strategy to the Venezuelan crisis. As the
international system continues to grapple with the issue of Venezuela in light of new political
situations, this research question will have continuing importance for foreign policy makers both
in United States and abroad.

Literature Review
Emigration from Venezuela and human rights abuses are pressing issues for the Western
Hemisphere and will continue to be as long as the Maduro regime maintains power. The
independent variables I will focus on include: freedom of the press, political repression,
repression of the opposition party, COVID-19 and a decaying healthcare system, arbitrary
violence sponsored by the government, arbitrary detentions, the economic sanctions placed by

external actors, the amount of foreign aid being received by Venezuela, and immigration policies
of receiving countries. These independent variables all play a role in explaining the dependent
variable of emigration from Venezuela. There is a broad consensus regarding the importance of
these variables and how they affect migration flows and the frequency human rights abuses
perpetrated by the Maduro regime.
The Maduro regime has continuously denied freedom of the press and access to
information by the general population. There are multiple laws prohibiting criticism of the
regime or the President and have been used to detain reporters and people from the general
population (State Department). Both journalists and private citizens have been targets of these
laws as 24 people were arrested for criticizing the government over the internet and 39
journalists were detained in three months in 2018 (State Department). A majority of the news
that is easily accessible, is promoted by state run entities or are former state entities that are still
easily pressured by the Venezuelan government. The Venezuelan government has made it
evident that freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the free exchange of ideas will not be
tolerated. These are direct violations of human rights that are standard within the international
community.
The human rights conditions in Venezuela have deteriorated since Nicolás Maduro came
into power in 2013. Many of the examples given throughout this paper are human rights
violations, such as the lack of free and fair elections or the inability to access adequate medical
care. But there are also a variety of other human rights abuses that occur in Venezuela that are
also perpetrated by the Maduro government. Arbitrary arrests of political figures and average
citizens that oppose the government are normal occurrences under the Maduro regime and since
2014 over 15,000 people have been arrested through connections to different protests (Human

Rights Watch). Some of these arrests include warrantless arrests at people’s homes and being
charged under military courts which is standard under dictatorships and is not a new practice in
Latin America. It is also reported that torture once people are arrested has occurred, but there is
no way to verify the number of deaths that have occurred due to this or the number of people that
have suffered as there is no transparency (Human Rights Watch). The use of the military to prop
up the Maduro regime is to be expected as the authoritarian government under Maduro provides
a breeding environment that allows for military to repress the population without oversight
(Davenport, 1995).
Connected to arbitrary arrests is the violence perpetrated by the government that occurs
daily in the country. Venezuela is one of the countries with the highest numbers of violent
homicide and in 2017 the Observatorio de Venezuela found that 26,616 violent deaths were
reported and that 15 people were killed per day by the police or the military (Buxton, 2018). It is
important to note that these numbers are likely owing to the corrupt criminal justice system and
the lack of accurate reporting in the nation. While the country had a ban on private gun
ownership, this law did not make a dent in the number of violent deaths in the country (Buxton,
2018). These numbers have increased owing to the high numbers of colectivos (armed groups
propped up by the Venezuelan government) and the presence of Las Fuerzas de Acciones
Especiales (FAES) in the country.
When there are high numbers of arbitrary detentions, and the high levels of government
sponsored violence, it is likely that the international community will see high levels of irregular
migration from the afflicted country. Many arbitrary detentions are related to opposition politics
and protests in Venezuela. This mirrors what has happened in many autocratic regimes
throughout the world. In order to maintain power, countries such as Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and

Iran have unlawfully detained political dissidents and potential political candidates in order to
maintain power (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski, 2014). These arbitrary detentions limit the
power of the opposition party and create democratic backsliding. These detentions of protestors
and political candidates have been used in South America under many dictators including in
Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and 80s. State sponsored violence has also been a tool for
governments to control dissidents. The Fujimori government in Peru during the 1990s used
paramilitary groups such as the one named rondas campesinos (peasant defense groups) in order
to attack dissidents that followed the ideas of Sendero Luminoso (Burt, 2006). In all of these
situations there were migration flows that stemmed from the fear of retribution and the inability
to express political thoughts freely, therefore I theorize that the arbitrary detentions and
government backed violence in Venezuela is one of the causes of emigration.
When freedom of the press is threatened or restricted, more people will begin to emigrate
from their country and Venezuela is no exception. The media has always played a watchdog role
in society, and it is expected that the media reports on human rights abuses perpetrated by the
government. In authoritarian regimes the media is often restricted, and journalists are often the
target of attacks. With a lack of free reporting, the population is unable to trust its government as
the government is able to repress its citizens with no independent watchdog to notify the public
of its actions. In this paper, media refers to both newsprint and digital independent businesses.
Demonstrated in the articles by Whitten-Woodring and Kim et. al. (2014), a cyclical relationship
exists between the media, the general population, and the authoritarian government that is
displayed in Venezuela. While traditional media has been restricted, there is still some media
reporting regarding human rights abuses by the government. When these abuses occur, the
population has protested and their demands have been meet with force and repression instead of

government reform. This force includes the use of police and military force against civilians,
forced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. This cycle has continued, but I take the cyclical
theory a step further as the opposition now fears the power of the government less people are
willing to risk the consequences of protesting. This additional step is where the connection
between emigration and restricted media is highlighted. In connection with the cyclical theory, I
theorize that as media becomes more restricted and the general population protests less,
migration becomes the only option to obtain the freedoms that the population does not have in its
own country.
Political repression also plays a role in the human rights abuses and migration that occurs
in Venezuela. Since 2013, Nicolas Maduro has consistently manipulated the government system
to aid him, his supporters, and the military. Political repression in this context is defined by
manipulating elections and limiting the power of the opposition forces within Venezuela. Mostly
recently in 2020, Venezuela held parliamentary elections in order to elect new representatives to
the National People’s Assembly. The election was widely regarded by the international
community as a power play by the Maduro government in order to consolidate power in the last
branch of government that the opposition controlled (Sequera, Buitrago, 2020). The opposition
party refused to participate, demonstrating that regardless of their influence the election would be
rigged (Reuters). Maduro has also limited the effectiveness of the opposition party in general.
Maduro has removed members of the opposition party from elections at all levels of government
through a variety of tactics, but the most well-known case was the house arrest of Leopoldo
Lopez in 2017 (Third Way). The arrest of Leopoldo Lopez came after he spent three years in a
military prison for inciting violence against the Maduro regime (LA Times). Leopoldo Lopez
was a well-known opposition leader that has supported Juan Guaidó as the rightful president of

Venezuela and the opposition movement even as he escaped in 2020 to Spain to be with his
family and continues to support the opposition movement (Maria Delgado, 2020).
Elections are one of the key elements to free society and democracy, but the Maduro
regime has almost eliminated its opposition party while it holds fraudulent elections in order to
maintain power. While an opposition party and movement does exist in Venezuela, it is severely
restricted which allows the status quo to be maintained. Venezuela is what Donno (2019) would
refer to as a Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR) as the opposition party has candidates in
elections and there are members that hold political office although not enough to create a
majority. CAR governments are not likely to transition to democracies due to the control that the
state maintains over elections and Venezuela will mostly likely maintain its current status as
there is not enough international pressure to hold credible elections. The repression of the
opposition party in Venezuela becomes worse during and after elections as Nicolás Maduro
attempts to debilitate the opposition party and movement even more. This repression is standard
practice in a regime that is attempting to maintain power as they are under a certain level of
pressure domestically and abroad (Pop Eleches and Robertson, 2015). Without the opportunity to
vote freely and express differing opinions than those of the government without fear of
retaliation, I theorize that people will be forced to migrate elsewhere. This situation is not
uncommon in South America and can be seen currently in other countries like Nicaragua as the
Ortega regime detains members of the opposition party in order to eliminate competitors in
elections.
Owing to the human rights abuses and poor conditions that Venezuelans live in under the
Maduro government, many democracies, particularly Western democracies, have placed
economic sanctions on Venezuela. While there has been a variety of sanctions placed on

individuals within the Venezuelan government, there have also been broader sanctions placed by
the United States that have impacted the country’s population negatively. One of the biggest
financial sanctions placed by the Trump Administration was prohibiting access to American
markets by any entity of the Venezuelan government (FAS, 2021). This included the state-owned
oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. This adversely affected the economy, leading to less
jobs than there were already. This action in addition to Executive Order 13835, which prohibited
the purchasing of Venezuelan debt, left the country unable to renegotiate their debt leading to
extreme belt tightening (FAS, 2021). Owing to the belt tightening, the few social programs that
still existed under Maduro lost significant funding. These sanctions are typical of a U.S. response
to far-left regimes and have been utilized in South America for decades.
The European Union and the United States have both taken significant action against
individuals that have propped up the Maduro regime and benefited from their corruption. Under
the Trump Administration, the Treasury Department implemented a variety of individual
sanctions that included Nicolas Maduro, his wife and son, along with multiple members of the
Supreme Court, and leaders of the army and police (FAS, 2021). These sanctions helped target
those individuals benefiting from the suppression of the Venezuelan people while creating the
least amount of damage to the economy overall.
While economic sanctions may not be intended to affect the general population, most of
the time economic sanctions imposed by external actors have devastating effects on the economy
which forces people to look elsewhere for economic opportunities. Economic sanctions against
authoritarian regimes, particularly personalist dictators like Nicolás Maduro, strengthen the
resolve of a government and move the country further away from liberal tendencies (Walldorf
Jr., 2014). By strengthening the resolve of the government but hurting its overall economy

personalist dictators are forced to reallocate money (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010). These
actions typically result in more money being placed in the military or other areas that will help
the regime maintain power and less money being allocated for social services (Escribà-Folch and
Wright, 2010). Without acceptable levels of social services, especially in a country such as
Venezuela where these services were promised chavismo (the leftist political ideology that
adheres to Hugo Chávez’s political ideals), people must live with less than normal. Without
proper social services many people begin to look for other options including migration.
Economic sanctions do not harm personalist dictators but places the burden on the general
population which forces them to immigrate.
Even though multiple countries have sanctioned Venezuela, there are a variety of
countries that have supported both Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro which has helped keep the
government afloat despite its challenges and setbacks. Some of these countries include China,
Russia, and Cuba. Cuba has supported Venezuela since the beginning of the Chávez regime and
while their impact may not be as strong now, their actions helped create some of the issues seen
today. Both China and Russia pose as threats to regional stability due to their involvement with
both the Chávez and the Maduro regimes. Both countries have provided economic aid, resources,
and political cover to Nicolas Maduro when needed.
While economic sanctions have the ability to cripple an economy, foreign aid, such as the
one given by China, Cuba, and Russia to Venezuela’s dictators can help mitigate the effects of
sanctions. Supporting actions by external actors can help prop up a regime that disregards human
rights, therefore when this occurs more people will migrate in order to escape the conditions in
their home country. When malign external actors provide foreign aid to autocratic regimes it
stabilizes the regime and reinforces the actions of those in power (Bader and Faust, 2014). In

addition to this, foreign aid is also sent to countries where the leader is in danger of losing power
(Licht, 2010). Therefore, it is understandable that leaders of autocratic regimes in need of foreign
aid are supported by malign actors. With this support, leaders are able to funnel money into
holding on to power instead of allocating the money towards public services. Since the Chavez
regime, foreign actors have supported Venezuela which has impacted its citizens. Owing to the
previous research in this area and Venezuela’s history, it can be assumed that the foreign aid
provided to Venezuela by external actors has led to influxes in irregular migration.
Adding to an unstable economy that has worsened under the Maduro regime, the
COIVD-19 pandemic has created new issues. A growing concern in South America and globally
is the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on migrants. This impact has already
played a large role in Venezuela as many countries around the world hit the one-year anniversary
of coronavirus shutting down their nations and economy. According to Castilla and Sørenson
(2019), many migrants that had crossed the border prior to coronavirus displayed
malnourishment and due to the lack of access to medicine in the country. COVID-19 has
exacerbated these issues as many hospitals lack running water and soap in addition to the
necessary medical supplies like ventilators that help fight the virus (Reeves, 2020). In 2017, labs
were only able to process at 20% capacity and 85% of medicines were unavailable (Buxton,
2018). Owing to these issues, many Venezuelans have looked to other countries to live in but
many receiving countries have shut down their borders. Those that are able to leave move
towards Colombia, as the border between the two countries is largely unguarded and there are
ways around the shutdown entry ports (Palau, Rueda, 2020). There is a growing consensus that
COVID-19 has impacted more than just the number of migrants leaving Venezuela. Many

countries are turning away migrants or placing them into quarantine or isolation centers that will
actually increase the spread of the disease (Ellis, 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated the shortcomings of
healthcare systems worldwide, but natural disasters have been leading causes of emigration
throughout history. An example of this is in 2010 when Haiti was rocked by a 7.0 earthquake
which led to an immediate influx of migrants (Diaz, 2020). While COVID-19 is a natural
disaster like the earthquake in Haiti, it differs in many ways. The migration flow that stems from
COVID-19 will be vastly different than the migration flow seen by the international community
in 2010. People were unable to travel for over a year and while irregular migration still occurred
the rates significantly slowed. Prior to the pandemic, it was expected that the Venezuelan
migration crisis would surpass the Syrian refugee crisis in 2020 which did not occur due to the
pandemic. Therefore I theorize that COVID-19 limited opportunities for migration but
exacerbated the conditions that cause migration therefore, as restrictions ease on travel and more
countries begin to take in migrants again there will be a surge of Venezuelans leaving.
During the pandemic it was expected that the Venezuelan economy would shrink by 25
percent which would increase the lack of economic opportunities in the country (Santarelli,
2020). In the article by Nel and Righarts (2008), motive is a concept used as a reason for civil
unrest, but in this situation it can be applied to migration as well. Venezuela’s lack of economic
opportunities, deteriorating healthcare system, lack of funding for public services, high levels of
poverty, and high levels of food insecurity are motives for people to leave. COVID-19 has
exacerbated all of these factors which will lead to sharp increase in migrants in the near future.
Natural disasters have always been a main cause of migration and Venezuela and COVID-19
will be no exception.

The final important factor is the policies that receiving countries have towards migrants
in general but more particularly towards migrants from Venezuela. South American countries
such as Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru, but other countries have also been impacted such as
the United States and Spain (Cheatham, Cara Labrador, 2021). Many countries have taken in
hundreds of thousands of migrants and are now facing an unprecedented situation with COVID19. In the article by Castilla and Sørensen (2019), the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and the International Organization for migration estimated over 5,380,000 migrants
would have left Venezuela by 2019, therefore it is possible that this migration flow could top the
Syrian Refugee crisis. This means that as migrants start to travel again it is obvious that the
international community is not prepared to handle the influx of migrants that many countries will
see in the coming months and years.
As countries begin to open their doors and change their immigration policies, more
migrants are willing to leave their homes in search of refuge. The history of migration in South
America is complicated as many countries have experienced both immigration and migration
depending on different factors such as economic opportunity and regime change (Durand and
Massey, 2010). Emigration that is caused by autocratic regimes has been documented in South
America since the mid-1900s (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). Some of these countries include in
the Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay, the Pinochet regime in Chile, and many other military
coups throughout the Southern Cone (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). During these migration flows
open door policies helped migrants find work and assimilate until they were able to return to
their home country, if they choose to do so. Therefore it is not surprising that many South
American countries have taken in Venezuelan migrants, but what is different with this migration
is the increasing number of migrants that are leaving. I theorize that the open-door policies that

have been used by many South American countries have put into place again will lead to more
Venezuelans emigrating.

Hypotheses
Human rights abuses span a variety of different areas in daily life from a lack of free and
fair elections to arbitrary detentions. There are a variety of variables that fall under human rights
abuses that may have a connection to the influx of migrants leaving Venezuela. While there is
debate about how much these abuses impact the average citizen, an example being the detention
of opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez, it is clear that many Venezuelans have felt the effects of
the Maduro regime and have been forced to leave. For some migrants it is a variety of these
human rights abuses that have forced them to flee their homes. The Maduro regime has held
power in Venezuela since 2013 and the lives of Venezuelans has progressively gotten worse.
It is important to note that migration within South America owing to autocratic regimes
and human rights violations (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). What separates the Venezuelan
migration crisis from past migration history is the historic number of people that have left
Venezuela which currently is estimated to over 5 million. While there are many other factors that
lead to migration, it is important to recognize that human rights abuses perpetrated by the
government. have been a leading problem in South America since the mid-1900s. For these
reasons, I argue that the various human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chavez and Maduro
regime have caused emigration from Venezuela. The hypotheses I propose are:
H1: As the Maduro government limits freedom of the press, more people will flee Venezuela.
H2: As the Maduro regimes represses the political system, more people will immigrate to other
countries.

H3: As the Maduro regimes represses the opposition party, more people will immigrate to other
countries.
H4: As arbitrary detentions continue; more people will emigrate from Venezuela.
H5: As state sponsored violence continues to be a problem in Venezuela, more people will
immigrate to other countries.
H6: As external actors place economic sanctions, there will be more Venezuelans leaving their
home country.
H7: Foreign aid has supported the Maduro regime, which has increased the number of migrants
leaving Venezuela.
H8: As COVID-19 pandemic continues worsen, there will be increased levels of emigration from
Venezuela to other nations.
H9: As receiving countries open their borders, more Venezuelan migrants will leave their
country.

Analysis
Freedom of the Press
Since the Chavez regime, freedom of the press has been limited and Nicolás Maduro has
furthered the actions of his predecessor. Media and the press have been the target of the state
since Maduro came to power in 2013. Some of the actions used to target the press include
controlling news outlets/broadcasts that are critical of the regime through censorship, detentions
of journalists, deporting journalists, and the spread of false information that is broadcasted by
state media. These actions have left many Venezuelans without the basic information that is used
in daily life such as information regarding elections, politics, and violence. Without this
information, the Maduro regime has been able to continue its oppression of the Venezuelan

population without independent reporting to address the issue. While general oppression
increases in Venezuela, so does the number of migrants looking to leave. This repression of free
media and increase in propaganda from the government has impacted many Venezuelans
decision to immigrate.
State run media outlets have become more common under the Maduro regime which has
led to less independent reporting. Since 2013, 115 media outlets have closed under the Maduro
regime which has left the population with few options to choose from (Share America). By
eliminating potential media outlets, the Venezuelan government can control the storyline. Many
times, this storyline includes false information or censorship that is intended to prop up the
Maduro regime. An example of false information is when there was a historic blackout that
lasted longer than five days that impacted almost the entire country (The Borgen Project). While
the cause of the blackout was a technical issue at the Guri Dam that supplies 80% percent of the
country with power it was originally reported by Nicolás Maduro that the cause was an
cyberattack perpetrated by the United States (The Borgen Project). When false information is
spread by government entities and there is no independent watchdog to contradict or investigate
those statements, the general population is left in the dark wondering whether they can trust their
government which attributes to the democratic backsliding that has plagued Venezuela since the
early 2000s. When democratic backsliding occurs, it common to see waves of out migration from
the affected country.
While false information is a threat to Venezuela, so is censorship. Under the Maduro
government censorship has become more common and occurs in a variety of ways. One way that
the government censors independent media is through legal investigations (Human Rights
Watch). A newspaper business, Panorama, was forced to shut down when the business came

under investigation by the Administration of Customs, Duties, and Taxes for alleged improper
actions regarding the business’s taxes (Human Rights Watch). A second example of legal action
is when La Patilla, a news website, had multiple members of its staff, including founder Alberto
Ravell, faced a criminal defamation lawsuit after republishing information from a foreign news
source that stated Diosdado Cabello, a pro Maduro politician, was involved in drug trafficking
(Human Rights Watch). During this lawsuit a court order attempted to forced Ravell and the staff
to stay in Venezuela which led to Ravell and other staff members to fleeing the country. Another
tool for censorship that the government utilizes is blocking access to a variety of websites and
social media platforms. This form of censorship is the most effective because it eliminates
messaging from international sources and the opposition party. The Maduro regime has blocked
access to YouTube, Instagram, Periscope, online news sites, and VPNs to control the flow of
information (Nugent, 2019). It is also common for live events or speeches from Juan Guaido
streamed on social media or other websites to be inaccessible as the Maduro regime will shut
down access to the platform (Nugent, 2019). Internet freedom has steadily decreased in
Venezuela under the Maduro regime which can be demonstrated in Figure 1 that includes
Freedom House scores and various examples. According to Venezuela Sin Filtro, an independent
internet freedom watchdog in Venezuela, in 2019 there was a concert in Colombia to raise
awareness and funds for aid to go to Venezuela and the Venezuelan government blocked live
streams of the concert. Censorship is a threat to democracy and when people are unable to access
information it leads them to distrust their government and potentially leave their country.
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Detentions and deportations of independent journalists have become common practice in
Venezuela which has repressed independent media as people become fearful to report on issues.
According to Reporters Without Borders, it is common for domestic journalists to face threats
and physical violence whereas foreign journalists are arrested and deported. These are tools that
the Maduro regime uses in order to suppress independent journalism and control the media. In
2018, 22 journalists were detained, and less than six months into 2019, 39 journalists had been
detained (Share America). These numbers reflect a need for the Maduro regime to control
journalists to maintain power. There have also been various reports of physical violence against
journalists. One example is when Elyangelica Gonzalez, a reporter from Univision, was attacked
by the Venezuelan military when covering a protest in 2017 (Share America). Luis Carlos Díaz,
an employee of Unión Radio, was arrested on his way home from working at a local radio station
and while under arrest was tortured by the Venezuelan government (Share America). Jorge
Ramos, who worked for Univision, was deported from Venezuela after his crew’s materials were
confiscated be he asked Nicolás Maduro to address human rights abuses and the increasing issue
of food insecurity in the country (Share America).
Another journalist Joseph Poliszuk has also been held by Venezuelan police and other
security forces in connection with his investigative journalism that mostly addresses corruption

within the Venezuelan government (Nugent, 2019). Detentions of journalists became a larger
issue during COVID-19. Many reporters believed that COVID-19 cases were being
underreported by the government and many independent news organizations wanted to
investigate. Between March 2020 and July 2020 15 reporters were detained by Venezuelan
authorities (Pulitzer Center). Gleybert Asencio, Yonathan Torres, and Ronald Montaño,
members of a digital news media source, Crónico Uno, were detained by Venezuelan forces
when reporting on COVID-19 and were accused of falsely increasing the number of COVID-19
positive cases in their stories (Pulitzer Center).
Repression of journalists has forced reporters and their families to leave the country
citing safety concerns (Reporters Without Borders). Tamoa Calzadilla ran the investigative team
for Últimas Noticias, which forced her to publish information regarding protesters that had no
factual basis (Human Rights Watch). This incident forced her quit her job as she could not
continue to publish false or misleading information. Calzadilla’s husband, David Maris,
interviewed Leopoldo López’s wife for his job, but the Bolivarian National Guard took his
camera and equipment to stop publication of the interview (Human Rights Watch). These
incidents forced Calzadilla and Maris to leave the country, they now work for Univision in
Miami, Florida (Human Rights Watch). When journalists face abuses by the government the role
of watchdog is eroded, and people lose faith in their government. Repressing freedom of the
press not only forces journalists and their families to leave the country but pushes others to leave
their homes as well.

Political Repression
Over the last eight years, Nicolás Maduro has consolidated government power to solidify
his political power. There have been two main tactics used by Maduro to gain power and these

include holding fraudulent elections and altering the composition of the government. By using
these tactics, the Venezuelan government has lost its democratic characteristics and moved
towards an authoritarian regime. Since 2013, the Venezuelan population has slowly lost control
of its government and these actions have forced many people to leave Venezuela in search of
refuge.
Manipulating elections has been one of the main tools used by the Maduro regime to
increase their power. There are three main examples that demonstrate how Nicolás Maduro has
been able to effectively consolidate power through election manipulation. First, in 2017, Maduro
announced the creation of National Constituent Assembly in 2017 “as a mechanism for conflict
resolution” (Buxton, 2018). This move was used to bypass the legitimate national legislature of
Venezuela (the National People’s Assembly). The action was widely regarded by the
international community as another power move by the Maduro regime and the National
People’s Assembly rejected the move as well. After this national decree and national elections
for the NCA Smartmatic, the voting service for Venezuela, went public with information that the
number of voters had been manipulated by the government demonstrating that election was
unfair (Buxton, 2018). According to Buxton (2018), the Venezuelan government stated that 8.1
million Venezuelans had voted when, 30 minutes prior to polls closing, only 3.7 million
Venezuelans had voted.
Second, in 2020 Venezuela held parliamentary elections which were severely restricted
as many members of the opposition were not able to run (Sequera, Buitrago, 2020). The election
was seen as a power move by the Maduro regime to hold power in all three branches of
government. By severely restricting opposition parties, Maduro’s party was able to easily win a
majority within the National People’s Assembly. Finally, and in conjunction with the 2020

elections, Nicolás Maduro placed food centers next to polling stations to influence the outcome
of the election (Third Way). This action preyed on a population that is food insecure in order to
alter the status quo (USAID).
During Nicolás Maduro’s time in power, he has been able to gain control of both the
legislature and the Supreme Court. While his power within the legislature mostly stemmed from
election manipulation and repression of the opposition party, it was also supported by the
Supreme Court. In 2015, Maduro exercised his power through a lame duck Congress to expand
the Supreme Court to thirteen members (Vyas, Kurmanaev, 2015). This action allowed Maduro
to effectively control the actions of the next Congress, but more importantly allowed the
Supreme Court to create laws that allowed Maduro’s party to win in the 2020 elections and
control two opposing parties (Vyas, Kurmanaev, 2015). By manipulating the composition of the
government, holding fraudulent elections, and creating the NCA, Nicolás Maduro has repressed
the political system of Venezuela. Its population is unable to vote freely and all democratic
norms that act as checks and balances have been eliminated. Without the ability to participate in
government nor petition their government for changes, many Venezuelans feel as if there is no
hope and the only way to create a better life is to migrate.

Repression of the Opposition Party
One human rights abuse that has occurred under Nicolás Maduro is repressing the
opposition party. Many of the actions that repress the opposition party fall under a variety of
human rights abuses such as lack of free speech, arbitrary detentions, and a lack of fair and free
elections. Without a strong opposition party, the Maduro government has been able to strengthen
itself to the point where it is nearly untouchable. The Venezuelan population has no legitimate
alternative to the Maduro regime and without the opportunity to vote in an opposition party that

is focused on rebuilding their country, many Venezuelans have made the difficult choice to leave
their home.
Nicolás Maduro has arrested not only dissidents and journalists that oppose his views, but
also prominent political leaders of the opposition movement. Arbitrary detentions will be
analyzed in the next section of this analysis, but it is important to recognize some important
arrests. Most recently, two congressmen were arrested in 2020 by Las Fuerzas Acciones
Especiales (Amnesty International). Congressman Renzo Prieto was arrested in March 2020 with
two of his assistants after they participated in pro Guaido protest (U.S. Embassy Venezuela).
This is the second time that Prieto has been arrested under the Maduro regime with his first
arbitrary arrest occurring in 2014 which lasted four years as he was held at El Helicoide
(Amnesty International). Congressman Gilber Caro was arrested at the end of 2019 and his
detention continued into 2020 on charges of terrorism (Sequera, 2020). Both of these arrests are
illegal due to the fact that members of Congress have immunity while they are members
(Sequera, 2020). The arrest of Leopoldo Lopez in 2017 was beginning of long campaign against
the opposition party (Third Way). Leopoldo Lopez was the face of the opposition movement
until his three-year arrest that was spent in a military prison (LA Times). His arrest led to the rise
of Juan Guaido who is now the leader of the opposition movement within Venezuela. Juan
Guaido’s actions have been severely limited by the Maduro regime to maintain its authoritarian
government. As mentioned previously, live streams of Juan Guaido’s speeches and social media
posts regarding the opposition movement are frequently blocked by the government to eliminate
any potential threats to the Maduro’s power.
Finally, it is also important to address how manipulated elections have led to one party
maintaining power in the legislature. While it has been noted that in 2020 the Supreme Court

helped eliminate potential competition, it should also be highlighted that many opposition
members did not run for reelection to either protest the corrupt political system and fraudulent
elections in Venezuela or did not run for the safety of them and their families (Sequera, Buitrago,
2020). Many opposition political members and dissidents have been forced to leave Venezuela as
they receive threats and fear arbitrary arrest of them or their family members for holding political
beliefs opposite of those of the government. For the reasons outlined above the opposition party
in Venezuela is weak and poses a weak threat to the Maduro regime without a strong showing of
support by the international community. While members of the opposition party and those who
share their ideals leave the country, many Venezuelans are left with no option to reform their
government and must look for a new place to restart their lives.

Arbitrary Detentions
Arbitrary detentions and house arrests are another tool in arsenal for Nicolas Maduro to
use against those that threaten his power. While journalists and political figures are targets, many
average citizens have also been arrested by the Maduro regime. Many average citizens are
arrested at political protests supporting the opposition movement. Since 2014 over 15,000 people
have been arrested in connection to these protests (Human Rights Watch). These protests are
often meet with excessive force by the police and military and hundreds of arrested (Amnesty
International). While many of these arrests occur at protests, there are also reports of warrantless
arrests occurring at people’s homes and some are charged in military courts. It is also reported
that torture occurs once people are under arrest.
Many university students, activists, and political leaders have been arrested by a variety
of Venezuelan authorities. One of the most notorious holding locations is El Heliocoide which is
well known for the human rights abuses that occur there. Originally El Heliocoide was going to

be a drive through shopping mall, but now it is used as a holding cell for hundreds of prisoners
that range from student activists to well-known opposition leaders (Newland, 2019). Within the
building there were a variety of holding cells, but one known as Guantanamo was the worst as it
would hold roughly 50 prisoners with no light, air, or toilets and was very small (Newland,
2019). Many detainees recall being physically abused, receiving electric shocks, being suspended
by their wrists, raped, and psychologically tortured (Newland, 2019). These types of actions
were systematic and were put in place to create fear among the detainees.
Detentions of political figures is a common tool to silence the opposition party and there
have been high profile detentions under the Maduro regime. In 2017, Leopoldo Lopez was
placed under arrest for inciting violence at a protest against the Maduro regime (LA Times).
After his arrest, Lopez was placed under house arrest until he was able to escape in 2020 to live
in Spain and be reunited with his family while continuing to support the opposition movement. A
second high profile case was in 2014 when Rosmit Mantilla was arrested (Newland, 2019).
Mantilla was a well-known activist, supporter of gay rights, and after his detention was the first
openly gay member of the National People’s Assembly (Newland, 2019). Rosmit Mantilla was
placed under arrest and held at El Helicoide until his eventual release, but afterwards he fled the
country fearing that he would eventually be arrested again (Newland, 2019). After the 2020
parliamentary elections many opposition members, including Juan Guaido did not run citing that
the election outcomes would not be fair, but with this the members lost immunity. Therefore,
there are widespread concerns that Guaido could be subject to arrest or house arrest under the
Maduro regime. Arbitrary detentions of citizens, journalist, university students, and political
figures have instilled fear in the Venezuelan population and therefore has forced many citizens to
flee to live safer and more predictable lives.

State Sponsored Violence
State sponsored violence instills fear in a general population which leads to them to live
suppressed lives and forces people to immigrate. A major group that supports the Maduro regime
and arbitrarily arrests and kills citizens is Las Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales (FAES). This
group was created in 2017 under the guise of protecting communities vulnerable to violence and
drug trafficking but has targeted these populations and charged them with crimes of resisting the
authorities (Olmo, 2019). Many people have been arbitrarily detained or killed by these forces
and some family members have stated that torture is common tactic used after an arrest (Olmo,
2019). Even as FAES becomes more active in these areas, many people will not report these
situations to international organizations because there are fearful and there are few if any police
reports owing to corruption and the fact that FAES is a government organization. The United
Nations has investigated this group and they assassinated over 5,000 people in 2018 alone
(Cumming-Bruce, 2019). While there has been an investigation, there has been little action
against the group as the United Nations has no way to regulate what occurs within Venezuela’s
borders
While FAES does hold a prominent place in state sponsored violence colectivos play a
large role as well. A colectivo is an armed group that is sponsored by the Venezuelan
government (Gonzalez, 2019). These were created under Hugo Chávez and were paired with
community councils to be closer to local actions (Gonzalez, 2019). These community councils
were supposed to be spaces for communities to voice their opinions on how local funding should
be spent and resembled democratic ideals (Bean, 2015). Any movement in human rights
standards and democracy that could have derived from these communal councils was diminished
with the introduction of the colectivos that reported back to the government. Colectivos have

taken on a bigger role under Maduro and are present at opposition rallies. It is common for them
to join the police and military in controlling opposition protests and sometimes doing so with
excessive forces (Oppmann, 2019). According to the 2021 Human Rights report from Human
Rights Watch, colectivos have played an important in role in the COVID-19 lockdowns that
occurred in 2020. During lockdowns colectivos enforced stay at home orders in impoverished
neighborhoods and those that violated the order received various punishments that included
beatings and various torture methods (Human Rights Watch) In addition to colectivos there are
various armed groups including the National Liberation Army and Patriotic Forces of National
Liberation that conspire with polices forces and the military to maintain control of sections of
Venezuela (Human rights Watch). The methods used to control the population include murder,
forced labor, and rape (Human Rights Watch). Their roles are not only paramilitary, but they are
also there to support the Maduro regime and its ideologies as being leaders within their
communities (Open Democracy). State sponsored violence has led to the detentions and deaths
of many Venezuelans and with no mechanisms to protect themselves, a large portion of the
population has left the country in search of a safer place to live.

COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly impacted the future of migrants in South America.
COVID-19 has altered the situation in Venezuela greatly and will lead to more migrants leaving
the country. One of the situations that COVID-19 has exacerbated is the decaying health system
in Venezuela. Since 2017, the number of cases and deaths for preventable illnesses has increased
which forced the government to allow for some humanitarian aid that was distributed through
nongovernmental organizations (Buxton, 2018). With limited medical supplies, testing
capacities, lab capacities, and doctors COVID-19 has infected many people and has caused many

deaths. These resources have significantly declined since 2017 when the country’s lab
capabilities were processing at 20% capacity and 85% of routine medicines were unavailable
(Buxton, 2018). According to the United Nations, 60 to 100 percent of essential drugs are not
available in major cities such as Caracas as preventable diseases like measles and diphtheria have
seen an increase in cases. In addition to the lack of medical supplies, Venezuela has suffered
from a phenomenon known as brain drain. Since the Chávez regime doctors have been leaving
the country for a variety of reasons. Between 2008 to 2009 2,000 doctors left Venezuela which
accounted for 10 percent of the nation’s doctors (Hernández and Gómez, 2011). According to the
World Health Organization, there have been almost 260,000 COVID-19 cases and just under
3,000 deaths. While these numbers are lower than some of the statistics, there are concerns that
Venezuelan government is not being transparent about the number of positive cases nor deaths in
the country. This concern was highlighted in the section under repression of freedom of the press
as journalists have been arrested while attempting to demonstrate the reality of COVID-19 in the
country.
COVID-19 has impacted migration as it has greatly restricted movement as lockdowns
have decreased migration flows. Many Venezuelans were unable to leave the country due to
lockdowns, but now that borders have opened there have been increases in migration flows
globally. Both during lockdowns and after lockdowns many Venezuelans have left for Colombia
and Argentina as the border is porous and there are many ways to enter without going near
shutdown ports of entry (The Associated Press). A fear that many countries now have is their
ability to handle the influx of migrants and the potential threat of COVID-19 and COVID-19
variants. Many countries are dealing with this issue currently and it is important that NGOs and
the international community continue supporting developing nations in migration and the

necessary medical resources to continue permitting immigration (Ellis, 2020). COVID-19 has
disrupted the migration flow out of Venezuela, but as the healthcare system is affected by
COVID-19 and information regarding cases is withheld by the government, more Venezuelans
are seeking a country to live in.

Economic Sanctions
The Venezuelan economy relies predominately on oil and depends almost entirely on oil
exports in order to import a majority of goods including food and medicine. This reliance was
established under the Chávez government as many social programs were introduced while the
government focused solely on exporting oil. While this approach worked for a few years under
the Chávez government, it proved to be unsustainable and creates a highly volatile economy as
the price of oil fluctuates. Therefore, when oil prices have gone down, as occurred in 2008, 2017,
and 2020, the economy begins to crumble, and the people of Venezuela suffer. Oil prices have
continued to fall since then with the coronavirus pandemic, which led to a global halt in
transportation and production, which adversely affected the Venezuelan economy. In addition to
this, the Maduro regime responded to the post Great Recession difficulties by printing more
money which led to high levels of inflation (Third Way). According to Buxton (2018), this
inflation hit 2,616% in 2017 and eventually this helped led to largest economic collapse that was
not caused by a war in the last 45 years (Kurmanaev, 2019). The combination of the dependence
on oil and the severe economic sanctions placed on Venezuela by a majority of the Western
world have caused many Venezuelans to be unable to afford basic necessities, and there are few
opportunities for economic advancement. This has led to increasing numbers of Venezuelan
migrants in neighboring countries looking to start new lives.

American sanctions on Venezuela have played a prominent role in U.S. foreign policy
since 2014 under the Obama Administration. In 2014, Congress passed the Venezuela Defense
of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 which laid out a plan to work with the
international community and international organization such as the Organization of American
States to support Venezuelan society restore respect for human rights (Congressional Archives).
This piece of legislation also allowed for sanctions on individuals that were aiding the human
rights abuses in Venezuela (Congressional Archives). Acting upon this, President Obama issued
an executive order sanctioning seven high level members of Venezuelan security forces and
members of the government (Obama White House Archives). These sanctions highlighted the
level of seriousness that the U.S. government took human rights abuses in Venezuela.
Under the Trump Administration, economic sanctions continued to play an important role
in addressing the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. In addition to sanctions new executive
orders were put into place that had a larger impact on the economy which therefore further
pushed Venezuela into an economic down spiral. One of the biggest financial sanctions placed
by the Trump Administration was prohibiting access to American markets by any entity of the
Venezuelan government (FAS, 2021). This included the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de
Venezuela S.A., which adversely affected the economy leading to less jobs. This action in
addition to Executive Order 13835, that prohibited the purchasing of Venezuelan debt and
leaving the country unable to negotiate their debt leading to extreme belt tightening (FAS, 2021).
Owing to the belt tightening by the new austerity policies that the government put into place, the
few social programs that still existed under the Maduro regime lost significant funding. In
addition to these broader sanctions, the Trump Administration’s Treasury Department
implemented a variety of individual sanctions including Nicolás Maduro, his wife and son,

multiple members of the Supreme Court, and leaders of the army and police (FAS, 2021). These
sanctions help target those individuals that are benefiting from the suppression of the Venezuelan
people while creating the least amount of damage to the economy overall.
Since early 2021, the European Union began implementing a variety of sanctions that has
led to increased tensions between Venezuela and the European bloc. In February of 2021, the
European Union placed sanctions on more than 19 individuals within the Venezuelan
government which increased the total number of affected individuals to 55 (Emmott, 2021).
These sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets (Emmott, 2021). Responding to
these sanctions, the Venezuelan government declared the European Union Ambassador, Isabel
Brilhante Pedrosa, a persona non grata and gave her seventy-two hours to leave country
(Buchard, 2021). This was one of the most aggressive moves of the Maduro regime in response
to actions taken by the European Union. Economic sanctions do not only adversely affect
individuals, but also affect the greater population as whole. As leaders lose money, they often
decrease funding to social programs and make conditions in the country unlivable, therefore it is
unsurprising that as economic sanctions have become the main tool for fighting the Maduro
government, more Venezuelans have left the country.

Supporting External Actors
Foreign aid from external actors can help authoritarian regimes maintain power while
economic sanctions hurt the economy. Venezuela is no exception, and has received aid from
Cuba, Russia, and China which has eased the effects of sanctions and provided some stability.
Historically, Cuba was the biggest supporter of Venezuela as Fidel Castro supported Hugo
Chávez from the start and the two nations helped build regional continuity for a short period of
time. A majority of Cuban aid was provided through the military and members of the Cuban

army worked and currently work as the eyes on the ground for both Cuba and Chávez and
Maduro. After the death of Chávez and Castro and the introduction of bigger players on the
international stage, Cuba’s role has diminished in the country although their presence is still felt.
According to Ellis (2020), Cuban intelligence still plays an important role for the Venezuelan
government as the intelligence that they gather provides a clearer picture on the threats facing the
regime not only externally, but internally as the Venezuelan opposition movement continues to
grow. This allows for the colectivos and FAES to be aware of internal threats which enables
human rights abuses to occur. In terms of the economy, Cuba continues to buy oil from
Venezuela but not at a high rate (Ellis, 2020). Even though Cuba is not a huge importer of
Venezuelan oil, every dollar that is used on Venezuelan oil helps prop up the Maduro regime.
While Cuban support for the Venezuelan government has decreased it is important to realize how
history has created another ally for the Maduro regime.
Russia has played an increasing role in Venezuela under both the Chavez and the Maduro
regime has come to power in Venezuela. Over the last 15 years, Russia has provided both
financial and military aid to Venezuela that enabled human rights abuses. Russia has been one of
the top consumers of Venezuelan oil and the amount of debt that Venezuela owes to Russia has
proven to be extremely important. Rosneft, an entity currently owned by the Russian
government, originally loaned $17 billion to Venezuela (Ellis, 2020). When the government was
unable to pay back the debts, Rosneft took the opportunity to exchange the debt for control of
gas reserves allowing Russia to have unfettered access to Venezuelan oil (Farah and Babineau,
2019). This gave economic relief to the country as Venezuelan markets were unable to access
American markets owing to sanctions put in place by the Trump Administration and allowed
Russia continued access to a natural resource it wanted. Another way that Russia provided

Venezuela with a way to find relief from U.S. sanctions was the creation of cryptocurrency
which proved to be ineffective (Farah and Babineau, 2019). Venezuela has also bought $11
million worth of military equipment from Russia alone since 2005 in addition to the aid they
receive from China (Farah and Babineau, 2019).
In addition to arms, Venezuela has also been the beneficiary of tactical support from
Russia. Between 2019 and 2020, Russia deployed some of its military to the country which has
bolstered the Maduro regime (Ellis, 2020). The amount of military aid Venezuela has received
from Russia is what gives the country a formidable military and allows the Maduro regime to
control its population as its police, paramilitary units, and military units benefit from these
purchases. While it appears that this is minimal over a large period of time, it is important to note
that the financial support, the purchasing of Venezuelan oil, and military support aids the
Maduro government which in turn enables human rights abuses as the amount of funding that
benefits the public has greatly decreased under Nicolás Maduro.
China has played an increased role in Latin American under its Silk Road Initiative and
its Belt and Road Initiative. Venezuela was one of the countries to receive the highest amounts of
foreign direct investment. China has loaned Venezuela $62 billion since 2008 and was a large
consumer of Venezuelan oil and despite U.S. sanctions there is evidence that China continued to
buy oil through Rosneft (Ellis, 2020). In addition to buying oil, China’s national oil company
still holds a land grant in the Orinoco Belt region which is one of the most oil rich areas in the
world (Rendon, 2021). This land grant does not expire until 2035 providing China with access to
Venezuelan oil for years to come (Rendon, 2021). By loaning money and propping up the
Venezuelan economy, the People’s Republic of China is helping to dampen the effects of EU and
U.S. sanctions which provides Nicolás Maduro with the opportunity to continue oppressing his

people. This support does not only come in the form of investment, but also in terms of military
aid and basic necessities. In 2019, China aided Venezuela with roughly 40% of its food imports
and has continued to provide military aid in the form of aircrafts and armored vehicles (Ellis,
2020). It has been widely known that the Maduro regime uses food as a tactic to force the
Venezuelan people to vote a certain way or pursue other courses of action, in addition to this
some armored vehicles provided by China have been used by the government to stop pro Guiadó
or anti Maduro protests (Ellis, 2020). Chinese weapons and crowd control weapons for protests
were used extensively in 2017 protests that led to 2,000 injuries and 163 deaths (Rendon, 2021).
China has aided the Maduro regime financially and in terms of its military which allowed for
Nicolás Maduro to maintain power and continue committing human rights violations.

Receiving Countries Policies
The final important variable is the policies that receiving countries have towards migrants in
general but more particularly towards Venezuelan migrants. South American countries such as
Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina and Peru have been impacted as well as the United States,
Spain, and some Caribbean countries as seen in Figure 2 (Cheathem, Cara Labrador, 2021). In
the article by Castilla and Sørenson (2019), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and the International Organization for Migration estimated that over 5,380,000 migrants would
have left Venezuelan by 2019 and the Brookings Institute estimated that the number could have
been greater than six million which would have topped the Syrian Refugee Crisis. This means
that as migrants start to travel again it is obvious that the international community must prepare
for the influx of migrants that the Western Hemisphere will see coming out of Venezuela in the
coming months.

Figure 2 Source: The Council on Foreign Relations

Colombia is the country that have taken in the highest number of migrants since 2015. In
2021, Colombia made an unprecedented move by providing a new status to previously
undocumented Venezuelans in the country. Colombian President Iván Duque has implemented a
new plan that will allow Venezuelans to live and work in Colombia for 10 years which provides
a new temporary status that migrants previously lacked (Otis, 2021). This will lead to increase in
the number of migrants attempting to go to Colombia as this status allows them to build a life. It
is estimated that by 2022 almost three to five million Venezuelans could live in Colombia, and it
is possible that this number will climb with the addition of this legal status (Buschschlüter,
2021). According to the New York Times, President Duque did put emphasis on the need for

international support as his nation has suffered the most from this crisis and he did emphasize the
need for other countries to follow Colombia’s lead which will be difficult as the pandemic
continues to damage the South American economy.
In comparison to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile have reversed their open policies
towards Venezuelan migrants. During the begin of the migration crisis, Peru had a welcoming
policy allowing Venezuelans to live and work in the country, but within the last few years these
policies have changed radically. Peru started to implement a series of laws that were focused on
limiting migration which came in the wake of the Venezuelan migration crisis (Amnesty
International). These laws have not changed since the beginning of the pandemic, but as
countries such as Colombia and the United States begin to provide temporary status to migrants
there is hope that their policies will change. In 2019, Ecuador followed Peru’s lead and began to
require visas from Venezuelans that wanted to work and live in the country as thousands rushed
to the border (Reuters). Also in 2019, Chile created the democratic responsibility visa providing
Venezuelans with legal status for up to two years, but this policy did not benefit Venezuelans
who clearly needed a long-term solution (Reuters). These actions limited the number of legal
migrants that came to those nations legally but increased the number of migrants crossing the
borders illegally and gave employers the opportunity to exploit vulnerable people in need of a
stable economic situation.
While Spain has taken in migrants, their stance on Venezuela is extremely complicated
owing to their coalition government and the parties differing stances on the political issues in
Venezuela. It is important to highlight that the colonial and immigration connection between
Spain and Venezuela. It is common to see migration between colonial powers and their colonies,
because of the shared history, culture, and language (Cerrutti and Parrado, 2015). It should also

be highlighted that there is a history of migration flows between Venezuela and Spain as during
and after Spain’s Civil War many Spaniards migrated to Venezuela. The United States has
started to play a larger role internationally with the Biden Administration providing Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) to Venezuelans until September 2022 when the situation in the country
will be reevaluated to see if it is safe for Venezuelans living in the United States to return (Sands,
Shoichet, 2021). While both the United States and Spain have provided safety for over 600,000
Venezuelans, these two countries can do more and are uniquely positioned to lead the charge on
the Venezuelan migration and political issue.

Conclusion
By using qualitative data, this research paper has demonstrated the extent to which
human rights abuses have played into the mass exodus of Venezuelans that has pushed South
American countries to the brink of their resources. Variables such as political repression,
oppressing the opposition party, economic sanctions, supporting actions by external state actors,
violence, the policies of receiving nations, arbitrary detentions, state sponsored violence, and the
coronavirus pandemic have provided a different outlook on how human rights abuses are tied to
these variables which has a direct impact on the migration flows that the international
community sees coming out of Venezuela. It is also important to highlight that these variables
are also intrinsically connected to one another and many times these migrants are leaving for a
variety reasons that are explained within these variables. While it is not possible to say that
human rights abuses are the main variable that has led to emigration, it is obvious that it plays a
large role in the current situation that the international community faces. The addition of some
data provides a picture that demonstrates a delicate situation that has progressively gotten worse
since the transition from Hugo Chávez to Nicolás Maduro. It also provides an alarming outlook

as to how a new variable, COVID-19, has played and will continue to play a large role in the
next wave of migration that South America which is unequipped to handle the health situation
with their own citizens let alone migrants.
This analysis provides support for nine hypotheses proposed in this paper. Repression of
freedom of the press, the political system, and the opposition party has worsened under the
Maduro regime leading to more people migrating to places where they work, speak, and vote
freely as well have a better future. Economic sanctions put in place by the United States and the
European Union have aided the downward spiral of Venezuela’s economy which has forced
many people to leave the country as they can’t afford rising prices of basic necessities nor find
economic opportunities. Supporting actions from external actors, such as Russia and China, have
aided the Venezuelan government’s systematic oppression of its citizens forcing the population
to leave the country. Finally, the onset of COVID-19 has exacerbated many of these variables
such as freedom of the press and has forced many Venezuelans to leave the country in search of
a new home with economic opportunities and stronger healthcare system. While this research
design is limited as it is impossible to understand why each of the over five million migrants
have left the country, it is an attempt to see how human rights abuses affect multiple areas of life
and plays a major role in migration flows.
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